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litigating position that the six-year period 
applies in overstated-basis situations. 
treasury sought to apply the amended 
regulation to all open cases, including 
ones in which judicial decisions had 
been rendered but had not yet become 
final. taxpayers challenged the validity of 
the amended regulation. a split among 
the lower courts caused the Supreme 
Court to hear the issue.
In Home Concrete, the Court held for 
the taxpayer, invalidating the regulation. 
the Court was seriously divided, 
however. Justice Breyer wrote an opinion 
which three other justices joined in full. 
Justice Scalia concurred in part and 
concurred in the judgment. Justice 
Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion which 
three other justices joined.
taxpayer-Friendly aspects
three aspects of Home Concrete will be 
encouraging to taxpayers. the first, of 
course, is the holding. as noted, most of 
the recent cases—including Home 
Concrete itself—involved tax shelters. as 
a result of the Supreme Court’s holding, 
decisions have been or will be entered 
for taxpayers in these cases. It has been 
estimated that the government will lose 
as much as $1 billion in revenue. But 
not just tax shelter “investors” and 
promoters will be cheered by the Home 
Concrete holding. the amended 
regulation was not limited to tax shelters. 
non-shelter taxpayers were the unrepre-
sented parties in interest in Home 
Concrete and are equally the beneficia-
ries of it.
Second, Home Concrete vindicates 
rule-of-law values. to me and many 
others, the government’s conduct had a 
“the ends justify the means” quality 
about it. the government’s briefs in this 
line of cases repeatedly stressed that the 
case involved a tax shelter. So what? 
Short of fraud, the nature of the 
transaction is irrelevant to the statute of 
limitations. to paraphrase Matthew 
5:45, the Code causes the sunlight of 
section 6501 to shine on both the good 
and the bad taxpayers.
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One of the main rule-of-law values is 
protecting reasonable reliance interests. 
“[J]ustifiable taxpayer reliance” was 
important to Justice Scalia. 132 S. Ct. at 
1846. the four dissenters also cared 
about this value although they thought 
the state of the law to be too uncertain 
to imperil “legitimate settled 
expectations.” Id. at 1853. We may hope 
that this strand of Home Concrete is 
reflected in future tax cases involving 
reasonable reliance.
third, Home Concrete helps allay 
fears arising from Mayo. Mayo held that 
challenges to tax regulations generally 
are evaluated under the deferential 
Chevron two-step, see Chevron, U.S.A. 
Inc. v. natural resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 u.S. 837 (1984), and 
it dispatched some of the stock 
contentions taxpayers had been using to 
challenge regulations. Many feared that 
these holdings, especially when 
combined with other rules deferential to 
agencies, could dramatically tip the 
scales in the government’s favor in future 
tax litigation.
One of those other deferential rules 
emanates from national Cable & 
telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 u.S. 967 (2005). 
In that case, the Court held that an 
agency may, by regulation, trump a prior 
judicial construction of a statute as long 
as the regulation is Chevron entitled and 
the prior court did not reach its result 
based on an unambiguous statute. yet 
neither Mayo, nor Brand X, nor their 
combination saved the regulation at 
issue in Home Concrete. taxpayers may 
thus hope that, despite Mayo, we are not 
in a “deference run riot” world.
at least some of the initial 
encouragement produced by Home 
Concrete may fade, however. Having 
found litigation and regulation unavailing, 
the government may now turn to 
legislation. treasury could ask Congress 
to amend section 6501(e) to incorporate 
the position in the amended regulation 
(although preoccupation with the 
upcoming elections might delay such 
action).
Moreover, a 4–1–4 decision is hardly 
so firm a foundation as to inspire 
unbridled confidence that rule-of-law 
values will be honored in future litigation 
and that pro-government rules of 
deference will not be applied to shield 
overly zealous tax administration. In 
short, enthusiasm about the pro-taxpayer 
aspects of Home Concrete must be 
tempered by awareness of what the 
future may bring.
Problems with Home Concrete
there are two unfortunate aspects of the 
Court’s decision. First, important issues 
in the intersection of tax and administra-
tive law were unresolved by the decision 
despite their having been briefed by the 
parties and the amici. Here are three 
examples. (1) When are tax regulations 
invalid because of their retroactivity? 
Only the dissent addressed this, and its 
remarks were brief. See 132 S. Ct. at 
1853. (2) Does Brand X empower 
agencies to trump even Supreme Court 
decisions? Home Concrete addressed 
this only situationally (in terms of 
Colony), not globally. (3) treasury had 
adopted the amended regulation initially 
as a temporary regulation which did not 
go through the notice-and-comment 
process prescribed by the administrative 
Procedure act (aPa), 5 u.S.C. section 
553. the subsequent final regulation did 
go through notice-and-comment. Does 
the initial failure to follow the aPa taint 
the later exercise that did follow the aPa? 
the lower courts disagreed about this; 
yet the Supreme Court was silent as to 
the question. these and other important 
matters will have to be addressed 
through possibly protracted future 
litigation. Opportunities were missed in 
Home Concrete.
the second problem is even worse.  
I and a growing number of others  
believe that Chevron is a disaster. For 
many reasons (detailed in part in the 
forthcoming Virginia tax review article 
cited above), Chevron was misguided 
when originally decided, and it has  
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only gotten worse as a result of  
subsequent decisions.
two of the problems with Chevron are 
the unpredictability of its application and 
the ease with which it can be 
manipulated by judges to accommodate 
results-oriented decision-making. Home 
Concrete exacerbates these problems.
there are two competing models as to 
the proper roles of courts and agencies. 
the “independent judgment” model puts 
courts at the center of statutory 
interpretation. e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the 
law is.”). the Court rejected that 
approach in Chevron, following instead a 
model in which courts defer 
substantially, though not entirely, to 
agencies. Brand X followed the logic of 
that deferential model to a perhaps  
uncomfortable extreme.
Chevron became worse when, in 
Mead and other subsequent cases, the 
Court held that Chevron applies only 
sometimes in agency cases and when it 
rejected possible bright lines for when 
Chevron does and does not apply. See 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 u.S. 
218 (2001).
Home Concrete does to Brand X what 
Mead did to Chevron. the Court could 
have chosen a bright line, such as that 
Brand X authorizes agencies to overturn 
only decisions of the lower courts, not 
those of the Supreme Court. But 
(unsurprisingly given the fact that Justice 
Breyer wrote the opinion) the Home 
Concrete plurality eschewed this and all 
other bright lines.
Instead, if the plurality’s approach 
holds in future cases, Brand X will 
require at least two separate inquiries: 
(1) whether the statute is ambiguous  
and (2) if it is, whether Congress 
intended to delegate to treasury and  
the Service the power to fill the gap.  
See 132 S. Ct. at 1843–44. this makes 
decision-making less predictable and 
more readily manipulable.
Justice Scalia accused the Home 
Concrete plurality of “revising yet again 
the meaning of Chevron— and revising it 
yet again in a direction that will create 
confusion and uncertainty,” thus making 
the Court’s “judicial-review jurisprudence 
curiouser and curiouser.” Id. at 1847 
(emphasis in original), 1848. Sadly, that 
may be the most enduring legacy of 
Home Concrete. n
